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Law as Language?
by Steven D. Smith*
It is an honor for me to be able to participate in this Symposium with
such distinguished company, and I want to thank the Mercer Law
Review and the symposium organizers for inviting me. I do feel a bit
awkward, though, commenting on Professor Marianne Constable's
paper.' As it happens, I agree with most of the sentences in the paper,
taken one-by-one, but I am not sure that I catch the larger vision that
the paper seeks to convey, and I am also unsure how Professor
Constable's astute observations about law and language respond to the
overall theme of this symposium-namely, "Citizenship and Civility in a
Divided Democracy."' So here I will try to discharge the duties of
commentator by attempting to explain my difficulty with the paper and
offering some very tentative observations about points Professor
Constable may be making.
Professor Constable's paper is devoted to describing various ways in
which law is bound up with, or is, language. Lawyers and judges work
in and through language. Contracts consist of written or spoken
language. Perjury laws punish particular forbidden uses of language.
The First Amendment' protects various kinds of uses of language
against government regulation. "[L]anguage is the medium of law,"
Professor Constable explains.' "It is more than a tool or resource; it

* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. Brigham Young
University (B.A., 1976); Yale Law School (J.D., 1979). I want to thank Larry Alexander
for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. Marianne Constable,Democratic Citizenshipand Civil PoliticalConversation:What's
Law Got to Do with It?, 63 MERCER L. REV. 877 (2012).
2. See PurposeStatement, Mercer University Law Review Symposium 2011, Citizenship
and Civility in a DividedDemocracy: Political,Religious,and Legal Concerns, MERCER LAW
(Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.law.mercer.edu/content/law-review-symposium-2011.
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Constable, supra note 1, at 877.
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constitutes the shelter from which we know the world and act in it ....
Our claims of law happen through our words in the world."5
All this seems to me perfectly true-too true, maybe. That is because
on first reading or hearing (and maybe on second reading as well, but
possibly not on third hearing?), Professor Constable's insistence that law
works pervasively through language seems to have all of the virtues, but
also all of the limitations, of an obvious truism.
Imagine a group of portrait painters who are discussing different
techniques for using light and color and perspective to convey a subject's
character. Now suppose someone joins the conversation and soberly
remarks, "In reality, you know, the essence of portrait painting consists
of the careful, artful use of paint. It is all about putting the paint on the
canvas in the proper form." Or suppose a group of builders is comparing
different ways of constructing houses-different architectural strategies,
different construction methods, and so forth-and someone sidles up and
says, "With all due respect, the truth is that houses are made of wood
and brick and concrete and plaster, and the real art of building houses
lies in putting the materials together in an efficacious way."
In each case these observations would be perplexing, not because they
are not true, but because they state what everyone already knows, in a
way that is not helpfully responsive to the questions being addressed,
but with a revelatory air suggesting that some important insight has
been delivered or some telling criticism has been laid down. The portrait
painters and the builders might be tempted to dismiss these observations as the product of some sort of peculiar category mistake. And yet
. . . it is possible that a hasty dismissal might miss some insight of real

significance.
So, what might be the deeper significance of Professor Constable's
seemingly truistic observations about the linguistic character of law?
Here, I need to be tentative. But in part Professor Constable evidently
intends her emphasis on language to present an alternative to a more
obsessively rule-oriented understanding of what law is or how it works.
And in this respect, I think she has a valid point.
For generations, of course, law teachers have routinely tried to make
a similar point to first-year students who come to law school expecting
to memorize codes of rules.' This past semester, I made something like
this point to my Torts students dozens of times, to the extent that they
became thoroughly weary of hearing the point (which is not to say that
they accepted or absorbed it). But it seems that Professor Constable has
something a little different in mind. Often, the law professors' homilies
5. Id. at 889.
6. See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930).
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to first-year law students about how law is more than "just rules" seem
calculated mostly to redirect the students' attention to something more
"meta," so to speak-something like "policies," or "principles," or the will
to power, or embedded social prejudices, or whatever. The focus is not
on the language of law itself, but rather on something that the language
serves as a window into, or maybe a window shade to block out.
That does not seem to be Professor Constable's purpose. Her
contention that law is language may reflect a more Wittgensteinian
perspective-one that aspires to be more attentive to the subtle,
mysterious workings of language itself. Wittgenstein, after describing
a straightforwardly referential account of language-this word refers to
that object, and so forth-suggested that this simple referential account
leaves out a good deal in the language. He famously offered a different
analogy: "Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little
streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions
from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new
boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses."
Wittgenstein's analogy seems to me wonderfully apt for describing
legal discourse, which is a marvelous composite of old and new-of
ancient phrases and fictions and forms that "rule us from [the gravel,"8
constantly jostling and joining with newer notions and categories and
terms. Students and professors today might prefer to dwell exclusively
in the more familiar "new boroughs with straight regular streets and
uniform houses," but they will thereby miss much of what makes the
law what it is.
So if Professor Constable's emphasis on language is intended to convey
this sort of Wittgensteinian insight, then I believe she is right, and
profoundly so. But Professor Constable is not merely offering a
perspective that will enhance our understandingof what law is and how
it works, as if we were merely curious visitors from another planet
trying to figure out what is going on. She clearly intends her contention
that law is language to have normative significance as well. So, what
sorts of normative implications flow from the contention, or the truism,
that law works through and is to some extent constituted by language?
One normative lesson that Professor Constable plainly wants to
underscore is that language can be misused in harmful or destructive

7. LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 1 18, at 8e (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958).
8. See F.W. MAffLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: A COURSE OF
LECTURES 1 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1968) ("The forms of action we have
buried, but they still rule us from our graves.").
9.

WITrGENSTEIN, supra note 7.
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ways. And here again, I think she is surely right, although I want to be
cautious in my agreement for a couple of reasons. For one thing, there
is some risk of a possible misdescription here. Misuses of law will no
doubt be reflected in the law's language, but it does not follow that these
problems are most cogently understood as misuses of language. Suppose
that on a dark street, a bellicose young man accosts a frail elderly
gentleman and growls, "Give me your wallet, or I'll kill you." The young
man has behaved badly, to be sure, but it would seem a little odd to say
that his badness consists of a misuse of language. ("The young man
misspoke. In this situation the proper thing to say is 'Good evening, sir,'
not 'I'm going to kill you.'")
But probably Professor Constable means something different and,
Wittgenstein
again, possibly something more Wittgensteinian.
emphasized how our language can confuse us and create traps for our
thinking. In a similar vein, Professor Constable refers to the ways in
which "law is susceptible to infelicities and incapacities of speech that
it cannot escape." 0 And she deplores "carefully uttered euphemisms,
formalisms, and obfuscations-traditional pathologies of law.""
I think this is a valid concern, and if there were more time, it would
be possible to give supporting illustrations; my illustrations would
include United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Brittl2 and Justice Breyer's
opinion for the Court in Stenberg v. Carhart.a But I would hasten to
add that, at least in the common law tradition, it is partly through the
slippery use of language-through obfuscation and equivocation-that the
law has been able to adapt to changing conditions and conflicting
interests. Legal fictions, as Sir Henry Maine explained (albeit with
apparent disdain), have been a principal mechanism through which law
has grown." The eminent legal historian S.F.C. Milsom remarked that
"[tihe life of the common law has been in the unceasing abuse of its
elementary ideas."" If he had heard Professor Constable's presentation, he might have rephrased to say that "the life of the law has been
in the unceasing abuse of its elementary vocabulary, or of its language."
That unceasing abuse, in Milsom's view, is a useful or at least necessary
thing, it is what sustains "the life of the law."

10. Constable, supra note 1, at 888.
11. Id. at 889.
12. 258 U.S. 268 (1922).
13. 530 U.S. 914, 920-46 (2000).
14. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WTH THE EARLY HISTORY
OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 24-27 (Charles Scribner 1864).
15. S.F.C. MIsoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAw Xi (1969).
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This point is relevant, I think, to the topic of this conference. In our
divided democracy, one thing that holds us together is the (seemingly)
shared understanding that we are all subject to and governed by
something we call "the Constitution," which continues to enjoy considerable prestige and perhaps even reverence. But as I have argued
elsewhere, the Constitution seems to be a fiction, and the name or term
is a fertile source of equivocation.'" True, there is a document-in the
Library of Congress, I think, though it does not really matter-that we
say is the Constitution. But that antique document does not itself
govern us, and if we check more closely, we find, I believe, that when
people refer to the Constitution they mean very different things.
Some people mean the words of the document as those words were
understood at the time of enactment. Other people mean the subjective
intentions of the people who wrote and enacted those words. Still others
mean something more sociological, evolving and elusive: the "traditions
and collective conscience of our people,"" maybe, or something more
ethereal and Platonic, such as ideal justice.s Or they may believe that
the Constitution is whatever the United States Supreme Court says it
is, and they may like this state of affairs: distant, robed masters in
marble halls are preferable, they may think, to stammering, sweaty
politicians in back rooms and town halls (among other reasons, perhaps,
because the robed masters are more refined or magisterial in their uses
of language).
So when we refer to the Constitution, we refer to different sorts of
things. In practice, it seems, the Constitution is a euphemistic fiction
that performs a function of diplomatic obfuscation. And it is arguably
the capacity of language, and of a common term, to beguile us into
thinking that we are committed to a common object-the Constitution-that helps us get along as well as we do, or to create and maintain
an "imagined community," 9 as they say. Indeed, some might expand
this suggestion to argue that the term "the law" itself is little more than

16.

Steven D. Smith, What Does ConstitutionalInterpretationInterpret?,in EXPOUND-

ING THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 21,34-37 (Grant Huscroft ed.,
2008).

17. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (punctuation omitted) (quoting
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
18. See, e.g., LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004).
19. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (2006).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

896

[Vol. 63

a fertile, obfuscating, and thereby (to some degree) sustaining euphemism.20

So I am not sure either that lawyers are in practice more careful about
language than other disciplines or citizens-lawyers can be careful about
language, even hairsplittingly or nitpickily careful, of course, when it
serves their purposes, as some of Professor Constable's examples
reflect2 2-or that more attentive and precise use of language is likely to
be of much help in addressing the civic disagreements that are the
subject of this conference. There are lots of possible accounts of the
causes of the cultural conflict and incivility we experience today. But I
doubt that an account offering "careless use of language" as a principal
cause will rise to the top of the list.
I should also point out that an undue emphasis on the linguistic
character of law can actually lead us to miss or misunderstand the
nature and reality of law. Robert Cover pointed out one way this can
happen years ago in a memorable essay, Violence and the Word.2
Criticizing what he perceived as a growing obsession among legal
scholars on how legal language should be interpreted, Cover replied that

20.

Cf A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, LEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAw 10 (1995).

For lawyers, to quote E.P. Thompson, writing in 1975 of what he calls "the
greatest of all legal fictions," "the law itself evolves, from case to case, by its own
impartial logic, true only to its own integrity. . . ." There is, of course, a sense in
which nobody really believes this any more, but it remains the case that much
legal behaviour proceeds on the assumption that the law is like that. For
example, all legal argument in court makes this assumption.
Id.
21. Professor Constable seems to acknowledge the point. "Indeed, one could argue that
'legalism' names precisely an overabundance of attention to language." Constable, supra
note 1, at 889.
22. However, I am not sure that Professor Constable's most extended example-the
curious and amusing incident of President Obama and the oath-tells us much of general
significance about law or lawyers, or even that it is actually an example of concern about
or close attention to language as such. See id. at 878-83. Indeed, Professor Constable
admits that nobody seems to have noticed-or, it would seem to follow, cared about-the
kinds of linguistic nuances that she reflects on at such length. See id. at 880-83. Instead,
if there is somewhere a coterie of extreme formalists who believe that Obama could not
validly become President without reciting the oath with perfect precision, these are
presumably people who view the oath as something like the password one has to type in
exactly in order to access one's email account. But in this view, the oath or password are
serving more as arbitrary gatekeeping requirements-it is not their character as words, or
as conveyers of meanings, that is important-and it hardly matters whether these requirements take the form of words, numbers, figures, physical gestures (like giving the secret
handshake), or even physical objects (like the correct key that opens the lock).
23. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, reprinted in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE
LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992).
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"[1legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death."' Cover
wanted his academic readers to understand that the law is a lot more
than words.
In a different way, an excessive focus on law's linguistic character can
distort the nature of law, and indeed of legal language, by denying or at
least overlooking the fact that law's language is always about and
always looking to something outside the language-not only to particular
facts outside the law and its language (the "facts of the case") but to
criteria of justice or morality that are assumed to be independent of
what lawyers and judges say about those realities. Lawyers' and judges'
talk about justice makes no sense except on the presupposition that
there is such a thing as justice that would be justice even if lawyers and
judges said otherwise. I have written elsewhere that "[iun focusing on
the discourse while declining to recognize or affirm what the discourse
refers to, discourse theorists are like the baby who, when his mother
points at a bird or a flower and says 'Look!,' stares intently at his
mother's finger."'
Does this criticism apply to Professor Constable? I am not sure: while
an earlier version of her paper seemed more committed to claiming that
law is language and not natural justice, public policy, or a system of
rules,26 in the current version these more exclusionary "and not" claims
(reflecting, it seemed to me, dubious dichotomies) have receded. In the
current version of the essay, perhaps the most pertinent passage is this
one:
Truth is the name for the promise of words to uncover the world, a
promise that is not always kept, whether by accident or through deceit.
Justice is the name we give to appeals that promises be kept, that the
world reveal itself to be in keeping with the judgments we make of it
through our words, religious or not, despite their limitations.'
These are profound, poetic, and possibly beguiling claims. But if I try
to practice the careful attention to language that Professor Constable
prescribes, then I have to say that (a) I am not sure what these
sentences mean, but (b) to the extent I can make out what they seem to
be saying, I cannot sincerely concur. Despite their eloquence, the
sentences do not describe what I understand truth or justice to be.

24. Id. at 203 (footnote omitted).
25. STEVEN D. SMrrH, LAW's QUANDARY 73 (2004).
26. Marianne Constable, What's Law Got to Do With It? Legal Language and Political
Discourse (2012) (unpublished) (on file with author).
27. Constable, supra note 1, at 889.
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So in the end, it seems to me, the emphasis on law as language offers
a valuable but limited and potentially distorting perspective. Professor
Constable is right, I think, that a close attention to law's linguistic
character and workings can provide valuable insights into one crucial
and fascinating dimension of the convoluted and elusive enterprise we
call "law." But law cannot, any more than life itself can, be reduced
down to a matter of language.

